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Contract
An Offer You Can't Refuse
Roland Fletcher*
Introduction
The general requirements of a valid contract must
contain an offer, acceptance, consideration, intention,
capacity and if necessary the correct formation, eg, does
the contract have to be in writing. The focus of this
article will be on offer, acceptance, consideration and
an invitation to treat when dealing with contracts
concluded during an auction.
Invitation to Treat
In order to prove a contract exists it must be shown
there was a definite offer made to either a particular
person or to the public at large, which has been
accepted. However, what may appear to be an offer
may constitute an invitation to treat. An invitation to
treat, in law, is not an offer but is inviting offers from
the public, eg, an advertisement 1 , usually, goods on
display in a shop window and a self-service 2. Bowen LJ
attempted to distinguish the difference between an offer
and invitation to treat as:
"It is not like cases in which you offer to negotiate,
or you issue advertisements that you have got a
stock of books to sell, or houses to let, in which case
there is no offer to be bound by any contract. Such
advertisements are offers to nefotiate - offers to
receive offers - offers to chaffer."
Arguably, this definition does not assist the courts
when dealing with auctions, eg, when the auctioneer
requests a bid for an item, which will be sold to the
highest bidder - does this constitute an offer or merely
an invitation to treat? The application of this
distinction was tested in the case of Payne v Cave4 and
was found to be an invitation to treat and not an offer.
The bids constituted the offer and acceptance would
take place on the fall of the auctioneer's hammer. This
has been given statutory authority under the Sale of
Goods Act 1979, which states:
"A sale by auction is complete when the auctioneer
announces its completion by the fall of the hammer,
or in other customary manner; and until the
announcement is made any bidder may retract his
bid."
5
Therefore, common law and statute have set the legal
rules, the auctioneer's request for bids constitutes an
invitation to treat and the bids an offer, which is
accepted upon the fall of the hammer. However, there
are exceptions to the general rule if goods are sold at
auction using the wording: with reserve or without
reserve.
Auctions With or Without Reserve
If an auction is said to be "with reserve", a minimum
price must be reached before acceptance is deemed to
be valid. If the auctioneer accepts a bid which is lower
than the reserve price there will be not contract
between the seller and buyer.6 However, if an item is
advertised stating "without reserve" case law has not
only suggested this is a definite offer 7 but also a
collateral contract between the auctioneer and bidder
(purchaser).8 Thus, in such circumstances if the
auction is held and a prospective purchaser makes a
bid, this is deemed to be an acceptance to an offer the
auctioneer cannot refuse.
A Definite Sale to the Highest Bidder
The case of Barry v Davies9 is an interesting case that
deals specifically with the issues and effect of a sale by
auction, which is expressed to be "without reserve".
The auction advertised two Alan Smart Engine
Analyser. Both machines were new and were being sold
by customs and excise due to the manufacturer's
liability for unpaid VAT. The machines were worth
£14,521 each and customs and excise had informed the
auctioneer, a Mr Cross, to sell the machines "without
reserve", and this was the basis of the sale. During the
auction Mr Cross informed the audience the machines
were worth £14,000 and suggested bids begin at
£5,000; there was no bid; he then requested £3,000 but
still no response. He then invited bids from the
audience and the plaintiff bid £200 for each machine
and no other bids were made. Mr Cross responded by
withdrawing the machines and defended his actions by
stating:
"I could not see how I could sell for as little as this,
even though it was without reserve. I think I am
justified in not selling at an auction without reserve
if I think I could get more in some other way later.
I did not take up [the offer of] £400. I thought they
were worth more."' 1
The machines were eventually sold a few days later for
£750 each after advertising them in a magazine.
The plaintiff brought a claim on the basis that the
machines were advertised "without reserve" and he
was the highest bidder. He claimed the value of the
machines, £28,000, less the value of his bid of "£C400,
resulting in damages of £27,600. Based upon common
law the Judge held:
*Lecturer in Law at the University of Glamorgan
'Partridge v Crittenden [1968] 2 All ER 421.2Fisher v Bell [1961] 1 QB 394 and Pharmaceutical Society of
Great Britain v Boots Cash Chemists (Southern) Ltd [1953] 1 QB
401.3Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co Ltd [1893] 1 QB 256, CA.
4(1789) 3 Term Rep 148.
5S 57(2).6McManus v Fortescue [1907] 2 KB 1.
7 Warlow v Harrison (1859) 1 E & E 309, obiter dictum, that in
such cases the auctioneer is making a pledge to sell to the
highest bidder.
8Barry v Davies (trading as Heathcote Ball & Co) and Others
[2000] 1 WLR 1962.
91bid.
10Ibid, p 1964, at para C.
Copyright' 2007 by Kluwer Law International. All rights reserved.
No claim asserted to original government works.
Business Law Review July 2001 163
Contract
"... it would be the general and reasonable
expectation of persons attending at an auction sale
without reserve that the highest bidder would and
should be entitled to the lot for which he bids. Such
an outcome was in his view fair and logical. As a
matter of law ... there was a collateral contract
between the auctioneer and the highest bidder
constituted by an offer by the auctioneer to sell to
the highest bidder which was accepted when the bid
was made."1 1
This view was supported on appeal by Sir Murray
Stuart-Smith who was also of the opinion that a
collateral contract may exist, in such circumstances,
between the auctioneer and bidder. 12 For these reasons
the original Judge's decision 13 on liability was upheld
Consideration: Quid Pro Quo
Mr Moran, counsel for the defendant, criticised the
court's decision on a number of grounds, eg, there was
no offer - this was an invitation to treat, there is no
contract until the auctioneer's hammer falls and any
bids may be withdrawn before such time. He
supported the latter point with section 57(2) of the Sale
of Goods Act 1979, and most importantly, he argued
there was no consideration for the auctioneer's
promise. For a contract to be valid it must be
supported by consideration, ie, an exchange of value:
quid pro quo. 14 The law will enforce a bargain, ie, a
contract supported by reciprocal consideration, where
both parties are able to demonstrate a benefit and
detriment on both sides.
Mr Moran argued that there was no consideration for
the auctioneer's promise to sell to the highest bidder.
He was of the opinion that the bid in itself would
constitute consideration as the person bidding is not
giving anything in return and that bids are merely a
discretionary promise to pay. Furthermore, he
attempted to negate the auctioneer's liability under the
rules of agency:
"... where an agent is acting for a disclosed principal
he is not liable on the contract ... If therefore there
is any collateral contract it is with the principal
[customs and excise] and not the agent [Mr
Cross]." 15
The court rejected Mr Moran's argument, based on the
principles of agency, with reference to the case of
Warlow v Harrison16 and reinforced their decision by
quoting from the judgment:
"In a sale by auction there are three parties, viz: the
owner of the property to be sold, the auctioneer,
and the portion of the public who attend to bid,
which of course includes the highest bidder ... We
think the auctioneer who puts the property up for
sale upon such a condition [without reserve] pledges
himself that the sale shall be without reserve; or, in
other words, contracts that it shall be so; and that
this contract is made with the highest bona fide
bidder; and, in case of breach of it, that he [the
bidder] has a right of action against the
auctioneer."17
Regarding the issue of consideration the court found it
to be present, in this instance, based on the following:
"... in my judgement there is consideration both in
the form of detriment to the bidder, since his bid
can be accepted unless and until it is withdrawn,
and the benefit to the auctioneer as the bidding is
driven up. Moreover, attendance at the sale is likely
to be increased if it is known that there is no
reserve."1
8
The Market Rule: Damages
Mr Moran attempted to reduce the plaintiffs damages
and argued the original Judge was in error when he
awarded the plaintiff £27,600. Mr Moran was of the
opinion that no more than £1,600 should have been
awarded. The original Judge's assessment was based on
the market rule, ie, to compensate the plaintiff for loss
of bargain and put him in the position he would have
been in had the contract been fulfilled.
Sir Murray Stuart-Smith examined the original Judge's
assessment on damages which was based on the
following:
"The plaintiff is entitled to be put in the position in
which he would have been in if the contract had not
been broken, that is, he would have had two newly
manufactured engine tuning machines. ... The
defendant's contention is that the value of these
machines, ie, the measure of the plaintiffs loss, was
only £1,500, [representing the price they were
eventually sold for] but that sum would not put the
plaintiff into possession or into a position to obtain
possession of two brand new £14,000 tuning
machines. ... I find that the measure of the
plaintiff's loss is indeed £28,000, less the £400 of
his bid, namely £27,600.'
19
Therefore, the market rule prevailed and the plaintiff
was awarded damages accordingly.
Conclusion
Applying the above legal rules a contract is not
concluded until the auctioneer's hammer falls, which
signifies acceptance of the bidder's offer. However,
there are exceptions to the general rule and lessons to
be learnt from the case of Barry v Davies. This case
demonstrates the courts are prepared to reverse the
process when goods are offered using the wording
"without reserve", which may result in an offer you
can't refuse and a collateral contract between the
auctioneer and person making the highest bid.
1 Ibid, p 1964, at para F.2lIbid, p 1968, at para A.
13Judge Charles Harris QC siting at Northampton County
Court.14A compensation, or the giving of one thing of value for
another thing of like value.15Barry v Davies, supra, n 8 at p 1965, para D.
161 E & E 309.
17Cited in Barry v Davies, supra at p 1966, at paras B, C and E.18Ibid, at p 1967, para H.
191bid, at p 1968, paras E, G and H.
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Employment Law
The Potential Impact of the
Human Rights Act 1998 on
Employment Law
Jane Johnson*
LLM
Introduction
New legislation, the impact of European Community
laws, and changing political ideologies have brought
about substantial changes to the employment
relationship during the last thirty years. Employers are
obliged to comply with a plethora of new laws which
regulate the workplace and take account of common
law principles such as the developing area of mutual
trust and confidence. Section 1 of the Human Rights
Act 1998 incorporates Articles 2-12, and 14 of The
European Convention on Human Rights into UK law,
thus making Convention rights enforceable in the UK
courts. This potentially provides a catalyst for the
development of a new rights culture for employees,
emphasising the importance of the dignity and liberty
of individuals. Human rights issues are no innovation
in the employment sphere and individuals have
previously taken matters to the European Court of
Human Rights (ECHR) in Strasbourg.'
This article considers how the Act will be applied
with reference to previous case law, and reviews those
provisions of the Convention which will impact upon
the employment relationship. These include Articles 4
and 6, and Articles 8-11.
Application
The Human Rights Act 1998 enforces the rights of the
Convention by firstly providing in section 3 a general
duty on the domestic courts to interpret all legislation
consistently with the Convention "so far as it is
possible". If this is not possible, the legislation cannot
be set aside, but the House of Lords, Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council, the High Court, the
Court Martial Appeal Court, or the Court of Appeal,
may make a declaration of incompatibility under
section 2(4) that the law on the particular issue is
inconsistent with Convention rights. The rationale
being that the government would speedily review and
amend the existing legislation to ensure compatibility.
Secondly, section 6(1) imposes a duty on public
authorities to ensure that they do not act incompatibly
with a Convention right. Consequently, an employee of
a public authority will be able to enforce Convention
rights directly against his employers provided the
matter does not concern access to the civil service. In
both Kosiek v Germany2 and Glasenapp v Germany3 the
applicants were refused employment in the civil service
because of their political persuasions. The ECHR
decided these cases on the basis of whether the
individuals possessed the necessary qualifications for
the positions. A public authority is defined in section
6(3) to include a "court or tribunal" and "any person
certain of whose functions are functions of a public
nature ...". This provision is to be interpreted broadly
to include as much protection as possible.4
Palmer5 states that government departments, local
authorities, the police and immigration would be
covered, although the situation is more uncertain in
relation to quasi-public bodies such as Railtrack, which
performs both public and private functions. It is
suggested that the employment function of such bodies
would probably be considered private.6 In this sector,
employees will have only indirect protection as "courts
or tribunals ' 7 must not act in a way which is
incompatible with convention rights under section 6(1),
and have a duty to interpret the law in accordance with
Convention rights under section 3.
An analogy can be drawn between the horizontal and
vertical direct effect in European Community law using
the example of the definition of a public body in Foster
v British Gas.8 Thus a private worker would not be
protected under Article 9 against a dismissal on the
grounds of religious belief, yet a public sector
employee would have a direct right of action. However,
if a dismissal occurred, the applicant could bring the
matter to an employment tribunal which would make a
judgement taking into account Convention rights. This
concept is not new; the UK courts have previously
construed domestic law in line with The Convention.
9
Ultimately, the fact that Article 1 of The Convention
provides that States should secure Convention rights to
everyone within their jurisdiction, indicates that
disputes in employment law whether in the public or
private sector will be covered. Further, it has been
argued that in:
"practice it will make no difference whether the
defendant is a public or private body since the
courts giving judgment will have a duty to uphold
convention rights regardless." 10
Hence our common law will develop in line with these
decisions.
The rights are provided in Articles 2-12 and those
*Senior Lecturer in Law, Coventry University.
1 See for example, Young James and Webster v UK [1981]
IRLR] 408 and Ahmad v ILEA [1978] 1QB 36.
2 (1987) 9 EHRR 328.
3 (1987) 9 EHRR 25
4 The Lord Chancellor, HL Deb Vol 582 Vo11232 (3 November
1997).
5 Palmer S "Human Rights:Implications for Labour Law"
(2000) 59 CLJ,172.
6 See n 5, at p 173.
7 Included within the definition of a public authority in Human
Rights Act 1998 s 6(3).
8 [1990] ECR-I 3313.
9 See for example, Rantzen v Mirror Group Newspapers [1993] 4
All ER 975 and Middlebrook Mushrooms v TGWU [1993] IRLR
612.
'0 Sir William Wade "The United Kingdom's Bill of Rights" in
Hare and Forsyth (eds) Constitutional Reform in the UK:
Practice and Principles (Oxford:Hart 1998).
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relevant to the employment relationship will be
considered individually. These rights are not absolute
and each article contains further qualifications to
enable States to justify the interference which must be
"necessary in a democratic society". The latter has
been interpreted to mean that the State should
demonstrate a "pressing social need"'" and must
satisfy an identifiable and legitimate public interest.
12
All measures are subject to the principle of
proportionality. The Strasbourg Court also allows
states some "margin of appreciation", thus the UK is
allowed some control over its own ethics and standards.
Article 4 of the Convention
Article 4 provides that:
(1) No one shall be held in slavery or servitude;
(2) No one shall be required to perform forced or
compulsory labour.
This does not include military service or work carried
out as part of one's civil obligations.
Comment
It is very unlikely that this article will have much
relevance to employees in the UK, although the ECHR
has emphasised that the idea of forced labour or
compulsory labour may change over a period of time
and that Article 4 must be interpreted "in the light of
the notions currently prevailing in democratic states."
13
Only a few cases brought under this article have been
successful, partly because of the difficulties of the
definition of forced labour.
Article 6 of the Convention
Article 6 provides that " ... (in) determination of his
civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a
fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an
independent and impartial tribunal ... "
Several difficulties have transpired with regard to
which employment issues may or may not amount to a
civil right. 14 With regard to the private sector it has at
least become settled law that employment disputes are
civil disputes within the meaning of Article 6(1).15 This
would also include employees who may be employed by
a public authority, providing they are not technically
civil servants.16 Previous case law has decided that only
disputes which have a decisive impact on the ability of
the individual to continue his job are covered. This
would include questions relating to dismissal, 17 or
disbarment,' 8 and those where significant economic
interests are at stake.' 9 In the public sphere, the court
has adopted a very narrow interpretation of "civil
right" and case law in this area is quite difficult to
reconcile. 20  Generally, disputes relating to the
recruitment, employment and retirement of public
servants are outside the scope of Article 6.21 In
contrast, this Article has been held to apply to disputes
relating to purely economic issues, such as the payment
of a salary or pension, 22 or essentially economic
issues.2 3
Comment
Previous decisions have created confusion and
uncertainty with regard to the application of this
article. As Morris suggests, it would be preferable if
the protection were extended to all public and private
employees, especially as employment rights are shared
across both sectors in the UK.24  However, its
requirements will now "provide a touchstone against
which the activities of courts and other decision makers
will need to be judged.")25
Article 8 of the Convention
Article 8 provides a right to respect for private and
family life. The concept of private life has been
interpreted broadly and extends to "private space,
especially the home - to encompass personal security,
self-fulfilment and identity.",26 Previous case law of the
ECHR has indicated that matters relating to sexual
identity,27 personal information, 28 telephone calls from
business premises, 29  and personal identity, 30  are
protected rights under Article 8. Further, employers
who want to obtain information about their employees'
previous criminal convictions, or want to conduct
random drug testing, psychometric testing or body
searches, may violate this freedom.3 '
In relation to sexual preference, the impact of this
article has been significant in providing an action for
those dismissed from the armed forces on the grounds
of their homosexuality.3 2  However, the intrusive
interview techniques used were taken into account and
thus it is uncertain whether "less favourable treatment
1 Barthold v Germany (1985) Series A No 90: 7 EHRR 383.
12 See n 5, at p 184.
13 Van der Mussele v Belgium (1984) 6 EHRR para 32.
14 Morris G "The European Convention on Hunan Rights and
Employment Law: To which Acts does it Apply?" [1999]
EHRLR Issue 5, p 498.
15 Obermeier v Austria (1991) 13 EHRR 290.
16 C V UK 1987 54 DR 162 and Darrell v UK (1991) 69 DR
306.
17 X V UK 1984 6 EHRR 583.
18 Albert & Le Compte v Belgium (1983) 5 EHRR 533.
19 Salary or pension: see Lombardo v Italy (1996) 21 EHRR 188.
20 See n 14, at page 507.
21 Neigel v France [1997] EHRLR 424 and Balfour v UK [1997]
EHRLR 665.
22 Couez v France, Benkessiour v France (unreported) (24 August
1998).
23 Massa v Italy (1994) 18 EHRR 266.
24 See n 14, at page 511.
25 Baker C Human Rights Act 1998: A Practitioner's
Guide(Sweet and Maxwell 1998), at p 63.
26 Feldman D "The Developing Scope of Article 8 of The
European Convention on Human Rights" [1997] EHRLR, 273.
27 Bughartz v Switzerland (1994) Series A No 280-B; 18
EHRR.
28 Leander v Sweden (1987) Series A No 116; 9 EHRR 433.
29 Halford v UK (1997) 24 EHRR 523.
30 B v France (1992) Series A No 232; 16 EHRR.
31 Murray Clare "Unleashing the gene genie" December 2000
January 2001 Employer's Law.
32 Smith & Grady v UK [1999] IRLR 734; Lustig-Prean &
Beckett v UK [2000] 29 EHRR.
Copyright' 2007 by Kluwer Law International. All rights reserved.
No claim asserted to original government works.
166 Business Law Review July 2001
Employment Law
on the grounds of homosexuality" will amount to a
breach of Article 8 per se. 3 3 This problem has now been
overcome by the recent case of MacDonald v MOD
34
where "sex" within The Sex Discrimination Act 1975
was interpreted to be broad enough to include sexual
orientation.
In Halford v UK 35 a violation of Article 8 occurred
when an employer, unbeknown to the employee,
listened to the applicant's telephone calls at work.
Similar action would extend to interference with
personal correspondence, electronic communication,
and close circuit television. As this right is not
absolute, the employer may argue that the interference
was reasonable, has a legitimate business purpose, such
as health and safety, or security, and is necessary for
the smooth operation of the business, or the protection
of others. However, States are allowed a margin of
appreciation to determine which rights ought to be
protected. In Halford the Strasbourg Court declined to
provide guidelines on when such interference may be
justified, although it seems more likely that where the
employee is informed that monitoring may take place,
there is less chance of a breach.
There are also positive obligations on the UK to act
in a way which will provide individuals with the
opportunity to lead a normal family life.3 6 This
includes the right to live with one's family for the
enjoyment of each other's company. 3 7 Consequently,
this right may place obligations on an employer to
accommodate employees who want to change their
hours of work for family reasons. The obvious example
being women returning to work after maternity leave.
Comment
Article 8 has broad application, and provides concrete
rights for individuals at work. In practice a balance
needs to be struck between employees' rights, and the
employer's requirement to carry out a business. There
is evidence to show that employees do abuse
employer's resources. For example, employees spend at
least a half an hour per day surfing the internet for
their own private purposes, 38 and businesses with more
than 1000 employees, lose up to £2.5 million per year
from these activities.39 As a result, the introduction of
The Telecommunications (Lawful Business Practice)
(Interception of Tele-communications) Regulations
2000 provides some protection for the employer
whereby personal correspondence may be monitored
without violating Article 8. For example regulation 1
provides that the employer should make all reasonable
efforts where possible to inform the employee that
interception may take place and offer sound reasons for
this. It will be interesting to observe the developing
case law in this area, as the new Statutory Instrument
per se is in conflict with the general remit of the right
offered in Article 8.
Finally, the right to privacy has been reinforced by
the introduction of the Data Protection Act 1998. This
Act tries to strike a balance between an organisation's
need to know, and a data subject's right to privacy.
Employers have a duty to ensure that personal data
relating to employees is only obtained and used for
specific lawful purposes. This includes manual and
computerised records which must be relevant and up to
date. There are limitations and restrictions on
disclosure of this information to others, which would
be particularly relevant to employee references.
Article 9 of the Convention
Article 9 provides a right to freedom of thought,
conscience, and religion. This is an absolute right and
includes a right to change religion and belief, either
alone or in a community with others. However, the
right to manifest religion or belief in worship is
qualified and subject to limitation as prescribed by law
and necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
public safety, public order, health or morals or for the
protection of others. It has not been interpreted by the
Commission or the Court to impose substantial
burdens on the State.4 ° It covers many beliefs but does
not protect "each and every act which is motivated or
influenced by religion or belief'. 4 '
In Ahmad v ILEA,4 2 there was no violation of this
article when the applicant Muslim complained that he
was not allowed to be absent from work for 45 minutes
each Friday to attend his local mosque. Likewise, in
Stedman v UK,43 a refusal to sign a variation to the
contract of employment was not a breach of Article 9.
The applicant refused to work Sundays because she
thought this day should be devoted to non-commercial
family and religious activities. In both cases the
employer had carefully considered the situation;
Ahmad had been offered part time work to provide him
with the opportunity to freely attend the mosque, and
Stedman's dismissal was held to be on the grounds that
she could not work certain hours.
Comment
Currently, there is no UK legislation which protects
individuals against discrimination on the grounds of
religious belief. Although certain religions may be
regarded as a racial group for the purposes of the Race
Relations Act 1976, for example Sikhs, 4 4 and Jews.
45
Thus, The Human Rights Act may become more
significant in this area. However, case law of the ECHR
to date suggests that Article 9 has been narrowly
interpreted particularly where there is no specific
persecution of a religious belief.46  Additionally,
provisions within the European Community, under
Article 13 EC, indicate that there may soon be
33 Pitt G Employment Law (4h ed 2000), at p 74.
34 (2000) IRLR 748.
35 See n 29.
36 Markx v Belgium (1979) 2 EHRR 330 para 31.
37 Olsson v Sweden (1988) 11 EHRR 259 para59.
38 The Times 11 January 2000 "Who's reading your email?"
39 Infosecurity 99, Secure Computing Magazine and Net
Partners, Internet Solutions Inc.
40 Harris DJ, O'Boyle M and Warbrick C Law of The European
Convention on Human Rights Butterworths (1995) p 370.
41 Arrowsmith v UK (1978) 19 DR 5.
42 (1981) 4 EHRR 126.
43 (1997) 23 EHRR CD 168.
44 Singh v Mackintosh [1979] ICR 554.
45 Seide v Gillette Industries [1980] IRLR
46 Case Comment Stedman v UK EHLR 1997 5 544-46.
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legislation in this area.4 7 It seems that although this
article provides some protective rights, it is no
substitute for carefully tailored legislation on the
subject of protecting a worker's right to religious
beliefs.48
Article 10 of the Convention
Article 10 provides the right of freedom of expression,
and includes the right to hold opinion, receive and
impart information without interference from a public
authority. This is a fundamental right which is
necessary in a democracy for the public good,49 but is
not absolute. Under Article 10(2) a State may impose
"formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties" on
this right providing they are in the interests of the
general public and the State. For example, restrictions
on the grounds of national security, prevention of
disorder, protection of health, or protection of the
reputation of others would be covered. In Morissens v
Belgium50 a teacher openly criticised her superiors,
without proper grounds and proof, claiming she had
not been promoted because of her sexual orientation.
The ECHR found that the employer had not breached
Article 10 by dismissing her and ruled that teachers,
generally, have to accept certain restrictions on this
right because of the nature of their job. Further, in
Glasenapp v Germany,5 1 the offer of a teaching post was
revoked when it was discovered the candidate was a
member of the Communist Party. There was no
violation of Article 10, as the case concerned access to
the civil service 52 and it was held that individuals in
such positions should uphold the free democratic
constitutional system in Germany. This case can be
contrasted with Vogt v Germany, 3 where a teacher of
several years experience was dismissed on the grounds
that she was an active member of the Communist
Party. Her right to freedom of expression was violated
as there was no evidence to suggest she was trying to
exert improper influence on her pupils.
Article 10 has broad application, covering expression
of ideas, presentation of information, words, pictures,
image and even dress.
54
Comment
The impact of incorporation of this right may be
significant in relation to dress codes. Currently, the
application of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 to such
disputes has not been without difficulty. This is partly
due to the requirement of a comparison with the
opposite sex, and evidence of "less favourable
treatment". 5 5 Consequently, cases such as Smith v
Safeway 56 may be decided differently in the future, as
only where there are justifiable reasons for imposing a
dress code will Article 10(2) be satisfied. Smith, a
delicatessen assistant, was fairly dismissed for refusing
to have his hair cut even though it was tied back in a
ponytail. Already it seems that our domestic courts are
taking a more sympathetic approach,5 7 and it will
become much more difficult to dismiss an individual
who does not conform to employers' dress codes within
this new rights era.
Finally, the right in Article 10 has been strengthened
by the introduction of the Public Interest Disclosure
Act 1998. This has provided new rights for whistle
blowing employees against dismissal or detriment
where disclosure of information is in the public good.
This may occur in circumstances where an employee
reports that a criminal offence has been or is likely to
be committed at work, or where the health and safety
of individuals may be at risk.
Article 11 of the Convention
Article 11 provides the right to freedom of peaceful
assembly, association, and the right to join a trade
union. This is a positive obligation on the State5 9 but
not absolute. Lawful restrictions may be prescribed by
law if they are "necessary in a democratic society" in
the interests of national security or public good. These
may be imposed on members of the armed forces,
police, or of the administration of the State.
60
Ewing suggests that this right appears to be the most
significant for labour law, yet its interpretation has
been "disappointing and effectively used as an
instrument for undermining trade union security". 6 '
For example, the ECHR has held that Article 11 does
not guarantee protection for any particular form of
activity which trade unions choose to undertake.
62
Instead, it has protected individuals who have suffered
disadvantage because of non- membership,63  and
specifically protects their right to form and join trade
unions; although the union member is not guaranteed
any particular treatment. Likewise, the trade union has
a right to be heard, yet the collective agreement will
not necessarily be concluded.64 Further, although there
is no general right to engage in collective bargaining,
47 Council Directive establishing a general framework directive
for equal treatment in employment and occupation (Com (1999)
565, 25.11.99).
48 Clifford Chance Incorporation of The European Convention on
Human Rights: The implications for Business (1997). Smyth M
"Incorporation and its implications for business [1998] EHRLR
273.
49 Raz: "The Morality of Freedoms (1986) and "Free
Expressions and Personal Identifications" (1991) 11 OJLS, 303.
50 (1988) 56 DR 127.
51 (1987) 9 EHRR 25.
52 See n 3 supra.
53 (1996) 21 EHRR 205.
54 Stevens v United Kingdom (1986) 46 DR 245.
55 Sex Discrimination Act 1975, s 1(1) (a).
56 [1996] AC 456.
57 McConomy v Croft Inns [1992] IRLR 561.
58 Employment Rights Act 1996, s 43B.
59 Arzte fur das Leben v Austria (1985) 44 DR 65, 72.
60 GCHQ Council for Civil Service v UK (1988) 10 EHRR 269.
61 Ewing K D "The Human Rights Act and Labour Law"
(1998) ILJ, 279.
62 National Union of Belgian Police v Belgium (1975) 1 EHRR
578; Schmidt & Dahlstrom v Sweden (1975) 1 EHRR 637;
Swedish Engine Drivers Union v Sweden (1975) 1 EHRR 617.
63 Young, James and Webster v UK [1981] IRLR 408.
64 The National union of Belgian Police v Belgium (1975) 1
EHRR 578.
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the employer cannot refuse to do S0. 6 5 There is also
confusion over whether the Convention includes a right
to strike; following views contained in the International
Labour Organisation and The European Social
Charter, it seems fairly likely that this right would be
covered.
Comment
Article 11 has not been successfully challenged with
regard to the actual effectiveness of a union in
protecting members' interests, but instead has
protected individuals by upholding freedom of
association.66 It is submitted that this Convention right
will have limited impact in view of the protection
offered in national law. The Employment Relations Act
1999 has made significant changes to this area of
employment law, with a view to promoting a new
culture of partnership in the workplace. 67 For example,
the legislation provides for compulsory recognition of
trade unions in certain circumstances, 68  and an
employee is protected from dismissal during the first
eight weeks of lawful industrial action.69
Conclusion
In practice, The Human Rights Act 1998 may have a
limited impact on the employment relationship.
However, it will consolidate and contribute to the
individual rights culture, which has been developing
within the employment arena during the last thirty
years. This is a far cry from the master servant
relationship of the early twentieth century, and is
complimented by the European Union approach as laid
down in the Community Charter of the Fundamental
Social Rights of Workers. The Lord Chancellor
endorses this reasoning in suggesting that incorporation
of the Act will raise awareness of human rights
implications of all legislation and promote a rights
culture.7 °
The employment relationship is highly regulated;
employees already have many rights: a right not to be
unfairly dismissed,7 ' a right not to be discriminated
against on the grounds of sex,72 race,73 disability,
74
gender reassignment, 75 or trade union membership.
76
New European Community directives provide further
protective rights in the area of race and ethnic origin,
77
and will continue to develop within the framework of
the Social Charter. 78 However, the Human Rights Act
may provide legal protection for the individual where
national law fails. For example, most protective rights
are only available to individuals employed on a contract
of service,79 qualification periods are required for
certain rights to materialise, and cases brought under
the discrimination laws sometimes fail because of the
absence of a comparator, and the strict interpretation of
"less favourable treatment".
8 1
Potentially, there are no such restrictions where an
individual may claim under the new Act bearing in
mind the difficulties of the public/private divide.
Additionally, where a public authority is acting in a
private capacity as an employer, an employee is
precluded from bringing judicial review proceedings.8 2
The Human Rights Act provides a direct action in
respect of any violation of Convention Rights for
employees of public authorities.
As previously stated, difficulties arise over the status
of quasi-public authorities, and the courts will be left
to determine applicability. To date, the ECHR
jurisprudence suggests a broader interpretation to
provide wider protection.8 3 Clearly, the public/private
divide will become a fertile area for uncertainty and
argument.8 a Consequently, many applicants may prefer
to take action under specific legislation or on the basis
of well-established common law principles. Reliance on
the expanding implied term of mutual trust and
confidence, may provide an easier option where
breaches of Article 8, 9 or 10 are concerned.
Additionally, the range of reasonable response tests and
broad discretion offered to the Employment Tribunals
in unfair dismissals cases8 5 have strengthened the
management prerogative. It remains to be seen how the
tribunals will determine such cases having " ... a duty
to interpret the law in accordance with Convention
Rights" under section 3. Where the applicant has a
direct right of action under section 6, interpretation of
the relevant articles should provide important
guidelines for future decisions through the doctrine of
judicial precedent.
Finally, the Act rests uneasily in conjunction with
employment legislation, for example, breach of a
Convention right is not a valid reason for dismissal, 6
and remedies under the Act are limited8 7
Consequently, utilisation of current protective
legislation will be a more certain and viable option, and
the flavour of the enhanced rights culture will be
transposed indirectly under section 3, taking into
account any outcomes of cases under section 6,
ultimately contributing to a common set of standards.
65 Gustaffson v Sweden (1996) 22 EHRR 409.
66 See n 63
67 Government White Paper "Fairness at Work" Cm 3668 May
1998.
68 S 70A and Sch Al inserted into TULR(C)A 1992 by The
Employment Relations Act 1999.69 S 238A(3) TULR(C)A 1992.
70 HL Deb Vol 583 Col 1228 (3 Nov 1997).
71 S 94(1) Employment Rights Act 1996.
72 S 6(1) Sex Discrimination Act 1975.
73 S 4 Race Relations Act 1976.
74 S 4 Disability Discrimination Act 1995.
75 S 2A Sex Discrimination Act 1975.
76 S138 TULR(C)A 1992.
77 Dir 2000/43 racial or ethnic origin.
78 "Council Directive establishing a general framework directive
for equal treatment in employment and occupation" (Corn
(1999) 565 25.11.1999).
79 S 230 Employment Rights Act 1996.
80 One year's service required for a right not to be unfairly
dismissed s 108 Employment Rights Act.
81 Clark v Novacold [1999] 2 All ER 977.
82 R v East Berkshire HA ex p Walsh [1985] QB 152.
s3 Costello-Roberts v UK (1993) 19 EHRR 112 para 27.
84 Bamforth N "Public Authorities, Private Bodies and The
Human Rights Act" (1999) 58 CLJ 159.
85 Midland Bank v Madden [2000] 2 All ER 741.
86 S 98(2) Employment Rights Act 1996.
87 S 8 The Human Rights Act 1998.
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Financial Services
Friend or Foe? The FSA and Credit
Unions
Nicholas Ryder*
Abstract
The aim of this article is to assess how the Financial
Services Authority (FSA) intends to regulate credit
unions in the UK. Initially, the article defines what is
meant by a credit union and provides a brief overview
of the Credit Union Act 1979. Then the article gives a
brief overview of the statutory objectives of the FSA
under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000.
This is followed by an examination of the proposed
regulatory regime for credit unions published by the
FSA in December 2000. Finally, the article considers
how the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 will
affect credit unions.
encouraging savings, using pooled funds to make
loans to members at reasonable rates of interest, and
providing related financial services to enable
members to improve their economic and social
condition". 4
Furthermore, a credit union has been defined as:
.... a co-operative society offering its members
loans out of the pool of savings built up by the
members themselves.",
5
A credit union is a unique financial institution that it
is based upon the trust of its members, it is a co-
operative organisation, it aims to provide its members
with loan and savings facilities and that the credit
union is a democratic organisation controlled for the
members by the members. It is clear that a credit
union is vastly different from other types of financial
institutions such as banks and building societies in that
the interest rates that a credit union charges its
members on loans is regulated by legislation to 1% per
annumn 6 and because credit unions are based upon a
series of operating principles that apply to credit
unions throughout the globe.7
The Credit Union Act 1979
Introduction
A credit union is not normally perceived as a
mainstream financial institution within the UK, it is
traditionally referred to as a poor persons' bank.' It is
this stigma which the credit union movement in the
UK has fought against for over thirty years. In
contrast, throughout many parts of the world credit
unions have developed into well-established forms of
financial institution and have a high market share
compared to the traditional forms of financial services
providers such as banks and building societies. For
example, in the Caribbean there are over 380 credit
unions with 1,115,594 members, in the Republic of
Ireland, there are 536 credit unions with over 2,200,00
members, Romania has 4,653 credit unions with
1,822,548 members, in Canada there are 796 credit
unions with 4,190,029 members, the United States has
the largest number of credit unions for one country
with 10,171 and 73,893,871 members and Australia has
207 credit unions with 3,029,500 members. 2 On a
global level, the number of credit unions is 37,623 and
100,752,861 members. 3
A credit union can be defined as a unique financial
co-operative institution that is democratically
controlled by its members for the benefit of its
members and local community. The World Council of
Credit Unions defines a credit union as:
"... a unique member-driven, self-help financial
institution. It is organised by and comprised of
members of a particular group or organisation, who
agree to save their money together and to make
loans to each other at reasonable rates of interest ...
a co-operative financial organisation owned and
operated by and for its members, according to
democratic principles, for the purpose of
The Credit Union Act 1979 was intended to be simple
in its form and content by limiting the size of
membership, shareholding and loans to small amounts
consistent with the formative years of credit unions. It
is not surprising that the Credit Union Act 1979 was
drafted narrowly as the impact of credit unions at the
time was minimal.
The Act is divided into seven parts. The first part of
the legislation deals with the registration of a credit
union with the Registry of Friendly Societies. The
second part concerns the rules that apply to the
members of a credit union.9 The third part deals with
the operation of a credit union. 10 The fourth part of
the Act deals with insurance against fraud and
dishonesty." The fifth part of the Act deals with the
power of the Registry of Friendly Societies in
complying with its statutory requirements under the
Act.12  The remainder of the sections deal with
*Law School, University of Glamorgan
1 Moody, JC & Fite, G, The Credit Union Movement, Origins
and Development 1850-1970 University of Nebraska Press
(1971), Lincoln.
2 World Council of Credit Unions, Statistical Report, WOCCU
(1998), Madison.
3 Ibid.
4 Hereafter WOCCU.
5 Berthoud, R and Hinton, T, Credit Unions in the United
Kingdom, Policy Studies Institute (1989), London.
6 S 11(5) Credit Union Act 1979.
7 For a more detailed discussion of the Operating Principles see
8 Ss 1 to 3 of the Credit Union Act 1979.
9 Ss 4 to 6.
'0Ss 7 to 14.
' Ss 15 and 16.
12 Ss 17 to 20.
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transfers, amalgamations, general and miscellaneous
provisions. 13
Under the Credit Union Act, the Registrar of
Friendly Societies' 4 regulated credit unions. In its
annual report the Registrar stated that in 1999-2000,
the credit union movement continued to increase in
volume and this has led to a greater interest from the
financial sector in the way in which credit unions can
combat financial exclusion.1 5 Furthermore, when the
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 comes into
force' 6 the responsibility for the registration and
regulation of credit unions will be transferred from the
Registrar to the FSA. However, it should be noted that
the new and more comprehensive regulatory regime for
credit unions would not fully come into force until mid
2002. Over the course of time the powers of the
Registry of Friendly Societies are being transferred to
the FSA.1
7
The Financial Services and Markets Act
2000
The most innovative and important aspect of the
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 has been the
development of the statutory objectives that have been
imposed upon the FSA.18 For instance, section 2 of the
Act outlines the general duties of the FSA. In
particular, under section 2(1), in discharging its
functions, the FSA must as far as is reasonably possible
act in a way that is compatible with its regulatory
objectives. The FSA is to have four statutory
objectives under the Financial Services and Markets
Act 2000:
" to maintain market confidence in the financial
system; 
19
.20
" to increase public awareness;
" to ensure consumer protection; 2' and
" to prevent and reduce financial crime.
22
Section 3 - To Maintain Market Confidence in
the Financial System
Under section 3 of the Financial Services and Markets
Act 2000, the FSA is required to maintain market
confidence. The markets confidence regime is defined
as maintaining confidence in the financial system.2 3
This includes financial markets and exchanges,
regulated activities and connected activities. The term
confidence is said to provide investors and potential
investors with confidence in the integrity and orderly
conduct of the market. The first statutory objective of
maintaining confidence in the UK financial system is
shared jointly with the Bank of England, and which
according to the FSA can be delivered effectively
within the framework document. 24 This co-operation is
further enhanced by the cross membership
arrangements made by the Treasury, which exists
between the FSA and the Bank of England.
Section 4 - To Increase Public Awareness
Under section 4 of the Financial Services and Markets
Act 2000 the FSA is required to promote public
understanding of the financial system.2 5 This will
include the awareness of the benefits and risks that are
associated with different kinds of investment and
financial dealing.26
Section 5 - To Ensure Consumer Protection
This section deals with the protection of consumers.
Under section 5(2) of the Financial Services and
Markets Act 2000, the appropriate degree of protection
is stated. The factors include the differing degrees of
risk which are involved in different kinds of investment
or other transaction; the differing degrees of experience
and expertise that different customers have; the needs
of consumers may have in relation to advice and
accurate information and the general principles that
consumers should take responsibility for their
decisions.
Section 6 - To Prevent and Reduce Financial
Crime
The final statutory objective of fighting financial crime
will combine the efforts of financial regulation with
those of criminal law intelligence, investigation and the
prosecution agencies. The function of the FSA will be
to ensure that financial institutions have systems and
practices in place to protect themselves against being
used as vehicles by financial criminals. This provision
does not impose any duties on firms.
The number of high profile financial scandals that
have plagued and reduced the reputation of financial
providers are clearly a reason why the FSA has been
charged with reducing the extent to which it is possible
for those organisations it regulates to be used in
27connection with financial crime.
13 Ss 21 to 33.
14 Hereafter the Registrar.
15 Registry of Friendly Societies (2000), Report of the Chief
Registrar 1999-2000, HMSO: London.
16 For more detail on the revised timetable for implementing the
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 see: HM Treasury
Press Release, 33/01, "Implementing Financial Regulation", 15
March 2001.
17 For more detail see FSA (2001), Transfer of the Registry of
Friendly Societies to the FSA, FSA: London.
18 For a more detailed discussion of how the Financial Services
and Markets Act 2000 has amended the Credit Union Act 1979
see Sch 18 to the 2000 Act.
19 S 3 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000.
20 Ibid s 4.
21 Ibid s 5.
22 Ibid s 6.
23 Ibid s 3(1).
24 Memorandum of Understanding between HM Treasury, the
Bank of England and the FSA.
25 S 4(1) Financial Services and Markets Act 2000.
26 For a more detailed discussion see Blair M, Minghella,
Taylor, M, Threipland, and Walker, G Blackstone's Guide to the
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, Blackstone Press
(2001), London.
27 FSA A new regulator for the new millennium, FSA (2000),
London.
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The FSA and Credit Unions
The FSA will regulate banks, building societies,
insurance companies, friendly societies, Lloyd's, fund
managers, credit unions, investment and pension
advisers, stockbrokers, derivative traders and
professional firms offering investment services. It is
quite clear that the creation of the FSA will have a
dramatic impact on the credit union movement in the
UK. The Association British Credit Unions Limited
were fearful of its creation:
"It is not surprising that the Bill [Financial Services
and Markets Bill] does not impose on FSA any
specific duty to assure that its regulation preserves
this necessary diversity among providers of financial
services. In the absence of such a duty, we fear that
predictable bureaucratic tendencies will result over
time in 'one size fits all' approach to regulation".28
Given the ever increasing demands within the financial
services sector the FSA needs to be as diverse as
possible to ensure that it adequately serves those people
who do not have access to the mainstream financial
services. The issue of how the FSA will regulate credit
unions is still yet undecided as the full impact of the
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 will not be
known until at least 2002. Howard Davies 29 has called
for credit unions to stop being referred to as the "best
kept secret of the financial sector". He stated:
"I hope the FSA can help shine more light on the
movement, and help it to achieve its full potential to
offer low-cost efficient financial services to local
people, and make an important contribution to offset
the serious problem of financial exclusion. The
social aims of credit unions could be pursued more
effectively if they are managed on a more business-
like footing. Because only if credit unions have a
deserved reputation for sound management will they
be able to attract the deposit base they need to make
a real difference". 30
In December 2000 the FSA launched its first
consultation document relating to credit unions. 3' The
main features of the proposed regulatory regime for
credit unions are six fold. First, credit unions, in
addition to the existing requirements for registration,
will need to be authorised by the FSA to carry on
business. Secondly, the FSA considers that credit
unions should be required to comply in full with the
Financial Services Authority's Approved Persons
regime. Thirdly, credit unions will be required to
comply with the rules on systems and controls
contained in the Financial Services Authority's general
Handbook. This will require credit unions to have in
place systems and controls that are appropriate and
effective in certain instances. Credit unions will
continue to be subject to the restrictions as to the
amounts of money that they can lend members and the
periods of such loans.32 The FSA has proposed new
requirements for credit unions on capital and liquidity.
The FSA claims that these proposals are designed to be
flexible and provide members with sufficient protection
for members' savings without imposing an undue
burden on the credit union. Finally, the controversial
issue of fees has yet to be finalised. It is contested that
a credit union will pay an annual fee related to the size
of its business.33  Commenting upon the proposals
Howard Davies stated:
"We aim to develop a practical and proportionate
regulatory system for credit unions which should
meet the needs of the credit union movement and its
members. We are confident that these proposals will
improve consumer confidence in the financial
soundness of credit unions and that this will help to
provide the positive environment credit unions need
in order to grow and pursue their social
objectives." 34
The FSA asserts that its aim in relation to the
regulation of credit unions is to secure a reasonable
level of protection for all members of credit unions.
35
The proposals suggested by the FSA were that all
credit unions are compelled to comply with the high
level requirements contained in the Threshold
Conditions 36 as detailed in Schedule 6 to the Financial
Services and Markets Act 2000. Furthermore, that
credit unions must comply with the FSA's Principles
for Business.37 Furthermore, it is perceived that in
order for a credit union to undertake its business, the
credit union will need to be authorised by the FSA. A
credit union will become authorised by obtaining
permission to carry on certain types of activity. Under
the proposals suggested by the FSA, if a credit union
desires to lend amounts to members of no more than
£10,000 in excess of a member's shareholding for a
maximum period of 3 years and 7 years, and to offer
ancillary services, the credit union will need a deposit
taking permission with requirements attached setting
28 Joint Committee on Financial Services and Markets, Draft
Financial Services and Markets Bill: First Report, House of
Lords, 50 I-I, House of Commons, HC328 I-II.
29 Chairman of the FSA.
30 FSA, Credit Unions: Time to Stop Being 'Best Kept Secret',
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/press/2000/O36.html, 3 March 2000
(Accessed 5 July 2000).
31 FSA, The Regulation of Credit Unions, FSA (2000).
32 Ibid.
33 It should be noted that the banks and building societies have
indicated that they are prepared to subsidise the regulatory fees
for smaller credit unions. The FSA states that these discussions
are ongoing at the time of writing.
34 FSA Press Release, FSA/PN/149/2000, FSA regime to increase
confidence in credit unions, 4 December 2000, http://
www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/press/2000/149.htrml, (Accessed 9 February
2001).
35 Ibid.
36 In order to be authorised under the Financial Services and
Markets Act 2000, a firm is legally required to meet the
Threshold Conditions. These conditions represent the
fundamental requirements that all firms must meet if they are to
undertake a regulated activity. The Threshold Conditions are
the legal status of the applicant, the location of its offices, the
close links (this condition requires the FSA to be satisfied that it
can effectively supervise a firm, taking into account the structure
of the group to which it belongs or the other firms that have
close links), whether or not the firm has adequate resources and
the suitability of the firm.
37 The Principles are integrity, skill, care and diligence,
management and control, financial prudence, market conduct,
consumer interests, communications with customers, conflicts of
interest, customers: relationships of trust, customers' assets and
the relationship between the firm and the FSA.
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out those restrictions. 38 If a credit union wishes to lend
larger amounts for a longer period of time and provide
wider services to its members it will need to apply for a
deposit taking3 permission with a more permissive set of
requirements. ' Further proposals were that credit
unions should be compelled to comply in full with the
FSA's Approved Persons regime. The FSA's proposals
here would mean that any individual within a credit
union who holds a position of influence or authority
will need to be fit and proper to hold that position.
40
Some of the proposals contained within Consultation
Paper 77 were aimed at the management, systems and
controls of the credit union. Under these proposals, all
credit unions will be compelled to comply with the
rules in the senior management arrangements, systems
and controls as contained in Block 1 of the FSA
Handbook. Once the proposals have become enacted, a
credit union will be legally obliged to take reasonable
care to sustain an unambiguous and appropriate
distribution of noteworthy responsibilities among the
directors and senior managers within the credit union.
Furthermore, the directors and senior management will
be required to take reasonable care to create and
maintain such systems and controls that are
appropriate for their business. Finally, the credit union
will be required keep and maintain proper and accurate
records that provide a true and fair view of the state of
affairs of the credit union.41
The FSA has a legal obligation to reduce financial
crime42 and has introduced new rules in relation to the
prevention and detection of money laundering. The
FSA has proposed that the new rules on money
laundering will apply to all credit unions as did the
1993 Money Laundering Regulations. It is suggested
that credit unions should have no difficulty in
complying with the new regime on money laundering
as they have successfully complied with the 1993
Money Laundering Regulations.
Under the proposals suggested by the FSA, every
credit union will be required to draw up a successful
lending policy and those credit unions that will be
subordinate to the version 1 requirements will not be
permitted to makes loans to members of the credit
union exceeding £10,000 in excess of the member's
shareholding. Under the proposals the maximum
period for loans by a credit union which is subject to
the conditions under version 1 will be three years for
an unsecured loan and seven years for a secured loan.
Those credit unions that are subject to the
requirements under version 2 will be permitted to lend
members up to £10,000 in excess of the member's
shareholding or 1.5% of the total shares of the credit
union in excess of the member's shareholding, which
ever is the larger.
43
Other proposals suggested by the FSA concern the
capital of credit unions. Here, if a credit union is
subject to version 1 requirements, the credit union will
be required to have a positive net worth at all times.
New credit unions that are subject to the version 1
requirements will be compelled to have a minimum
initial capital of £1,000. If the proposals are agreed the
FSA will be permitted to vary the capital requirements
of individual credit unions at any time. Furthermore,
those credit unions that are subject to the requirements
under version 2, will be required to have a financial
risk management policy setting out how the credit
union intends to handle interest rates and funding
risks. Conversely, those credit unions that will be
subject to the requirements under version 1 will not be
required to adopt such a policy. This means that credit
unions subject to version 1 are not permitted to invest
in fixed interest government securities or be able to
rely to a significant extent on borrowings from banks".
It is contested that one of the most controversial
issues surrounding credit unions and their relationship
with the FSA has been the issue of fees. Chapter 8 of
the Consultation Paper dealt with this thorny issue.
Currently, the costs for regulating credit unions are
met by public funds.4 5 When the transfer from the
Registry of Friendly Societies to the FSA is complete,
credit unions will be compelled to meet the regulatory
costs. The FSA had held interim discussions with
representatives from both the banks and building
societies with the view to the banks and building
societies supporting these costs for a limited period.46
Other proposals were that credit unions' participation
in the Financial Services Compensation Scheme and
the Financial Ombudsman Scheme would be the same
as other deposit taking firms and that all credit unions
would be grand-fathered into the new regime.
It is contended that the creation of the FSA by the
government will have a dramatic impact upon credit
unions. In many circumstances, the FSA will alter the
perception of credit unions in the UK. For instance,
under the proposed regulatory regime,47 credit unions
will be required to become more business like and
improve their internal processes. The FSA will
enhance the protection of members of the credit union
as the FSA has a legal obligation to ensure that they
protect consumers who use financial services.48 The
legal obligation of the FSA to ensure that there is an
increase in consumer awareness 49 combined with the
objective of a credit union under section 1(3)(d) of the
Credit Union Act 1979, to educate its members will go
a long way towards illustrating that a credit union is
more than just a poor persons' bank. A further way in
which the FSA has altered the perception of a credit
union is to increase the public's awareness of the credit
union movement. Therefore, the FSA has had a
positive impact upon the perception of credit unions.
In response to the consultation paper, the
38 This is referred to in the Consultation Paper 77 as 'version 1'
requirements.
39 This is referred to in the Consultation Paper 77 as 'version 2'
requirements.
40 In order for a person to qualify as fit and proper, the FSA's
assessment will include the honesty, integrity reputation,
competence, capability and financial soundness of the individual.
41 N 32, supra.
42 S 6 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000.
43 N 32, supra.
44 Ibid.
45 The annual costs of regulating credit unions are
approximately £1.2 million.
46 N.32, supra.
47 Ibid.
48 S 5 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000.
49 Ibid s 4.
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Association of British Credit Unions Limited published
an Early Draft Position Paper outlining its responses.
50
In principle the Association of British Credit Union
Limited welcomed and supported a number of the
proposals made by the FSA.5 ' It did, however, raise
concerns over some of the central proposals made by
the FSA. For example, credit unions should have a
differentiated regulatory regime 52 when compared to
other financial service providers. With the
differentiated regulatory regime for the application of
approved persons and the FSA's proposed liquidity
requirements for credit unions, it is clear that the FSA
will have a dramatic impact upon the regulation of
credit unions. 53 But its full impact will not be known
until 2002 when the FSA completes its consultation
with the credit union movement.
Conclusion
The FSA is faced with a difficult dilemma between
protecting the uniqueness of credit unions and
implementing the Financial Services and Markets Act
2000. The proposals contained in Consultation Paper
77 will require credit unions to become more
professional and hopefully permit credit unions to
diversify the services a credit union offers to its
members. However, whether or not credit unions will
be able to fully benefit from the proposed regulatory
regime will depend upon the ongoing consultations
between the regulator and the credit union movement.
50 ABCUL, ABCUL Early Draft Position Paper on FSA
Consultation Paper 77 The Regulation of Credit Unions, ABCUL
(2001), Manchester.
51 This included the increase in the maximum loan limits for
credit unions with general reserve of 5% of assets, the further
increase in the loan repayments to seven years and the
agreement with banks and building societies to provide an
element of subsidy for the cost of credit union regulation of
credit unions for some credit unions.
52 ABCUL admitted that this would prove unlikely given the
cost implications.
53 For more detail see Ryder, N, "Diversity Is the Key to
Effective Regulation", (2000) 21 BLR 62-65.
News
Virt-X Recognised As An Investment
Exchange
Economic Secretary Ruth Kelly has given the Financial
Services Authority (FSA) leave under the Financial
Services Act 1986 to recognise Virt-x Exchange Ltd as
an investment exchange.
The decision was taken after the Treasury received a
report from the Director-General of Fair Trading
(DGFT) which concluded that the rules of Virt-x do
not appear likely to restrict, distort or prevent
competition to any significant extent.
Mrs Kelly said:
"I welcome Virt-x Exchange Ltd addition to the list
of Recognised Investment Exchanges in the UK.
The decision to move trading of Swiss bluechip
shares to a London-based exchange is further
confirmation of the UK's pre-eminence as an
international financial centre. It is also a clear vote
of confidence in our financial regulatory system."
Recognition as an investment exchange under section
37 of the Financial Services Act 1986 (the Act) enables
the exchange to carry out investment business in the
UK. The Financial Services Authority applied to the
Treasury for leave to recognise Virt-x Exchange Ltd
under section 120 of the Act.
Under the Act, the Financial Services Authority is
responsible for recognising domestic investment
exchanges. The Act also requires the Treasury to
consider a report by the DGFT on whether the rules of
the exchange have, or are intended or likely to have,
any significant anti-competitive effects.
Tradepoint Financial Networks plc which is a
Recognised Investment Exchange (RIE) changed its
name to virt-x plc on 5 February 2001. The virt-x
group is now undertaking a corporate restructuring
which involves the transfer by virt-x plc of all existing
RIE business to virt-x Exchange Ltd, which is a
wholly owned subsidiary of virt-x plc. Virt-x plc will
become a holding company for the group.
Virt-x is a market for pan-European blue chip stocks
that has been developed in conjunction with SWX
Swiss Exchange and the Tradepoint Consortium.
Virt-x Exchange Limited applied to the Financial
Services Authority for recognition on 4 May 2001. The
report from the Office of Fair Trading was received on
18 June 2001.
Recognition of Virt-x should provide UK investors
with greater choice and increase competition within the
UK financial services industry between other UK
exchanges.
The other domestic recognised investment exchanges
are:
London Stock Exchange
International Petroleum Exchange
London International Financial Futures and Options
Exchange
London Metal Exchange
OM London Exchange
Coredeal
Jiway
The recognition requirements are laid down in
Schedule 4 of the Act. To be recognised, exchanges
must, amongst other requirements:
Continued overleaf
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Books
Abridged Too Far?
Employment Law
By Holland and Burnett
Blackstone Press, .19-95 PB
It's a "mission impossible" situation. Write an
engaging and practical employment law textbook for
LPC students which doesn't run to five volumes, and
make sure its up to date.
This textbook succeeds in part. All of the main topics
are covered, apart from trade union recognition which
must, bizarrely, not be on the syllabus. The book was
pretty well up to date when it was written (law accurate
up to November 2000), but as practitioners will be
aware, employment law is in a constant state of flux
and so the book is already out of date, notably with
regard to status (the Motorola case), transfer of
undertakings (Oy Liikenne), maternity and fixed term
contracts (proposed legislative amendments).
To its authors' credit, the book is not written in
impenetrable legal jargon and has a useful section on
tribunal practice and procedure.
Ultimately, however, this book is let down by its
enforced brevity and, in some areas, a lack of clarity.
The overview at the start of the book skims too
lightly over the subject and, for me, confused rather
than clarified the issues. The layout is unhelpful and
the index too brief.
Once qualified, for example, junior solicitors will
soon be involved in drafting compromise agreements
and COT3 settlements. Neither topic appears in the
index, they are both dealt with very briefly and there is
no precedent for either.
Finding your way around the various sections can be
difficult, as the headings are not particularly user-
friendly (instead of "What is an undertaking?", you
have "A business or identifiable part of the business").
Another example is that affirmation of a breach of
contract was dealt with in the same section as an
employee resigning in response to a breach. Without
reading the whole section, this would have been
difficult to pick up.
Unfortunately, also, there are some errors: an
otherwise helpful table showing maximum
compensation which Tribunals can award gave the
aggregate of the basic and compensatory awards for
unfair dismissal (ignoring PIDA, or "whistleblowing"
cases). Dismissal for an "ETO" reason in TUPE
situations is described as being for "an additional fair
reason" (it is in fact deemed to be "some other
substantial reason" under the TUPE regulations) and
the book states that an employee who resigns in
response to an employer's imposition of new terms and
conditions in breach of contract will only be entitled to
damages limited to the equivalent of their notice pay
(this ignores possible unfair dismissal compensation if
the employee has sufficient qualifying service to claim).
The overall impression left by the book was that the
authors had too much law to grapple with and too little
time, or perhaps insufficient paper, to put it all down
on. Ultimately, this book provides an engaging
overview of employment law but its layout and, in
some areas, lack of clarity means that it is not ideal for
use by practitioners.
Emlyn Williams
Partner, Mace & Jones, Solicitors of Liverpool
and Manchester.
News - Continued from previous page
" have financial resources sufficient for the proper
performance of its functions;
" have rules and practices which ensure that business
is conducted in an orderly manner;
" limit dealings to investments where there is a proper
market;
" have adequate arrangements and resources to ensure
compliance with its rules.
Treasury Press Release 71/01, 21.6.01
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COMPUTERS AND INTERNET
Net Learning? I'D-"?
David Flint*
Introduction
Over the last few months I have been looking at
various aspects of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute
Resolution Policy ("UDRP") (http://www.icann.org/
udrp/udrp-policy-24oct99.htm) of the Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
("ICANN"). As will be recalled the UDRP applies to
all domains registered in the .COM, .ORG, .NET and
.EDU Top Level Domains ("TLDs") as well as to
domains registered in a number of minor Country
Registries ("ccTLDs") such as eg .nu, .tv, .ws.. It
does not apply to the .uk domain and Nominet (http://
www.nominet.org.uk) has just finished a consultation
on proposals for a dispute procedure for the UK.
If you register a domain name in one of the
Registries covered by the UDRP you are required to
submit to it; there is no alternative; for the domain
name owner the threat of a complaint under the
UDRP is omnipresent and real.
In Article 4 it is stated:
"a. Applicable Disputes. You are required to
submit to a mandatory administrative proceeding in
the event that a third party (a 'complainant') asserts
to the applicable Provider, in compliance with the
Rules of Procedure, that
(i) your domain name is identical or confusingly
similar to a trademark or service mark in which
the complainant has rights; and
(ii) you have no rights or legitimate interests in
respect of the domain name; and
(iii) your domain name has been registered and is
being used in bad faith.
In the administrative proceeding, the complainant
must prove that each of these three elements are
present."
In previous months I have reviewed a number of
cases in which the dispute procedure has been applied
(or misapplied); this month I intend to consider just
one case, but one which perhaps is amongst the most
significant cases in relation to the UDRP ever to have
been decided.
The Panel Decision
The case, NetLearning, Inc v Dan Parisi, was a split
decision of a three person panel appointed by National
Arbitration Forum, FA 95471 (Nat Arb Forum, 16
October 2000). Two of the panellists considered the
complaint to have been well founded and ordered
transfer of the name to the complainant, whilst the
third panellist not only considered that the complaint
had not been established but went so far as to state
that he considered the complainant to have been
engaged in reverse domain name hijacking.
Nothing particularly strange there; complaint made;
panellists appointed; name ordered to be transferred.
What is important in this case is that the
Respondent did not take the decision lying down;
indeed he sought to have it overturned before the
Eastern District of Virginia'.
*Partner in the IP and Technology Law Group,
MacRoberts Solicitors, Glasgow.
'Dan PARISI, Plaintiff, v NETLEARNING, INC, Defendant.
No CIV A 00-1823-A. 10 May 2001.
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The Role of The Court
In terms of Rule 4k of the UDRP, it is provided:
"k. Availability of Court Proceedings. The
mandatory administrative proceeding requirements
set forth in Paragraph 4 shall not prevent either you
or the complainant from submitting the dispute to a
court of competent jurisdiction for independent
resolution before such mandatory administrative
proceeding is commenced or after such proceeding
is concluded. If an Administrative Panel decides
that your domain name registration should be
cancelled or transferred, we will wait ten (10)
business days (as observed in the location of our
principal office) after we are informed by the
applicable Provider of the Administrative Panel's
decision before implementing that decision. We will
then implement the decision unless we have received
from you during that ten (10) business day period
official documentation (such as a copy of a
complaint, file-stamped by the clerk of the court)
that you have commenced a lawsuit against the
complainant in a jurisdiction to which the
complainant has submitted under Paragraph
3(b)(xiii) of the Rules of Procedure. (In general, that
jurisdiction is either the location of our principal
office or of your address as shown in our Whois
database. See Paragraphs 1 and 3(b)(xiii) of the
Rules of Procedure for details.) If we receive such
documentation within the ten (10) business day
period, we will not implement the Administrative
Panel's decision, and we will take no further action,
until we receive (i) evidence satisfactory to us of a
resolution between the parties; (ii) evidence
satisfactory to us that your lawsuit has been
dismissed or withdrawn; or (iii) a copy of an order
from such court dismissing your lawsuit or ordering
that you do not have the right to continue to use
your domain name."
Although the UDRP is commonly referred to as an
arbitration and its panellists as arbiters, in fact in the
UDRP it is stated clearly in paragraph 4 that what is
envisaged is a "mandatory administrative proceeding"
(whatever that is). Within the confines of the INTA-
List (tmtopics@lists.inta.org) there was a detailed
debate on this issue in March 2001. As is often the
case in this area, the nub of the problem was identified
and analysed by Professor Michael Froomkin who
stated (28 March 2001) :
"... The fundamental question is one of jurisdiction
to review followed by one of procedures and
presumptions that apply in the review.
If it is an 'administrative' procedure of a private
organisation, then the court is seized - if it has
jurisdiction at all - of a contract dispute (or maybe a
property dispute if you are bold). The action is
effectively de novo, for all it is called a review, and
for all that different roles (who is plaintiff), burdens
of proof, language, choice of law and procedure may
apply from the UDRP. There is likely to be
threshold issues of jurisdiction and whether there is
a cause of action.
If the court believes it is reviewing an 'arbitration'
then there may be special rules of jurisdiction,
procedure, and especially in the US, special
presumptions of correctness of the decision. It was
clearly the intent of the UDRP to avoid those
presumptions - [as] much at the request of the TM
bar as anyone else, since they believed they would
win in court and considered the UDRP to be a risky
unknown."
Clearly, 18 months on, the UDRP is no longer an
unknown and, from the TM bar perspective, not very
risky. However, for the registrant the stakes have
suddenly increased.
The Court Decision
On 30 October 2000, Parisi filed a declaratory
judgment action seeking a declaration of lawful use
under the US Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer
Protection Act ("ACPA"), 15 USC § 1114(2)(D), and
the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 USC §
2201, as well as a declaration of non-infringement
under the Lanham Act, 15 USC § 1125(a). Parisi also
sought an order directing the USPTO to refuse Net
Learning Inc's pending trademark application for the
"NETLEARNING THE ULTIMATE LEARNING
SYSTEM" mark, an award of fees and costs, and
further relief as the Court deems "just and proper."
As the court noted:
"Although ICANN exerts quasi-governmental sway
over the growth and administration of the Internet,
the UDRP is enforced through contract rather than
regulation."
Net Learning moved for dismissal of the action for
declarator on the sole ground that the complaint
constituted an improper motion to vacate an
arbitration award. Specifically, the defendant alleged
that Parisi failed to assert any grounds cognisable
under the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") for setting
aside an arbitration award and that, in any event,
Parisi's action was time-barred under the FAA
because it was not served on the defendant within
three months of the panel's ruling.
The critical issue was therefore whether the UDRP
decision was an arbitral award, and thus under the
FAA, or something else outwith the FAA.
"Federal courts apply the FAA, first and foremost,
to effectuate contracting parties' expectations for
resolving disputes. This is fundamentally a matter of
contract interpretation. Arbitration is a creature of
contract, a device of the parties rather than the
judicial process." 2 ("[A]scertaining the scope of an
arbitration agreement is primarily a task of contract
interpretation .... ").
Because the FAA does not define 'arbitration',
courts have liberally construed that term to
encompass various diverse dispute-settlement
mechanisms. "If the parties have agreed to
2AMF Inc v Brunswick Corp 621 F Supp 456, 460 (EDNY
1985) (Weinstein, J); see also United States v Banker's Insurance
Co, 245 F 3d 315, 2001 WL 293669, at *2 (4th Cir 27 March
2001).
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submit a dispute for a decision by a third party,
they have agreed to arbitration."3  (emphasis
added) An arbitration agreement may, by its own
terms, be amenable to enforcement through some
provisions of the FAA, but not others. The Fourth
Circuit recently distinguished "mandatory arbitration,
as a prerequisite to initiation of litigation" from
"binding arbitration, where the parties must accept an
award or decision of the arbitrator." 4 Commitments to
participate in such "mandatory" proceedings are
regularly enforced by compelling arbitration, or
staying litigation 5 pending arbitration. 6 ("[I]f one
party seeks an order compelling arbitration and it is
granted, the parties must then arbitrate their dispute
to an arbitrators' [sic] decision, and cannot seek
recourse to the courts before that time. ,)7.
Netlearning argued that the UDRP "administrative
proceedings" should be deemed an "arbitration" as
envisioned by the FAA and that Parisi's declaratory
judgment complaint should be treated as a motion to
vacate an arbitration panel's award which must
comport with the requirements of § 10 and 5 12 of the
FAA. Netlearning argued that because it was served
with Parisi's complaint over three months after the
UDRP panel issued its decision, any motion to vacate
is time-barred under 9 U.S.C. § 12. Netlearning
further argued that the complaint articulates no
cognisable ground for vacating an arbitration award
under the FAA. Parisi countered that the FAA does
not apply to the UDRP and that his complaint raises
issues far beyond the scope of the UDRP panel ruling.
As the court pointed out in its decision:
"Clearly, the UDRP creates a contract-based
scheme for addressing disputes between domain
name registrants and third parties challenging the
registration and use of their domain names.
However, in our view, the UDRP's unique
contractual arrangement renders the FAA's
provisions for judicial review of arbitration
awards inapplicable." (emphasis added)
First, there is no reason to 'stay' litigation []
because, quite simply, the UDRP contemplates
parallel litigation. Nothing in the UDRP restrains
either party from filing suit before, after, or during
the administrative proceedings. See UDRP, 4(k). If
litigation commences during the course of a
proceeding, the panel has 'the discretion to decide
whether to suspend or terminate the administrative
proceeding, or to proceed to a decision.'
Second, it would not be appropriate to 'compel'
participation in UDRP proceedings under 5 4 as a
prerequisite to litigation because UDRP
complainants, as strangers to the registration
agreement, are under no obligation to avail
themselves of the UDRP8 . Only the registrant is
obligated to participate in a UDRP proceeding if a
complaint is filed. If a registrant declines to
participate in the panel process, the panel may
simply 'decide the dispute based on the complaint'.
UDRP Rules, 5(e). Although the UDRP describes
the process as "mandatory" in the sense that a
registrant's refusal to participate may lead to an
uncontested loss of the domain name, the process is
not "mandatory" in the sense that either disputant's
legal claims accrue only after a panel's decision9.
Third, because the remedies available through the
UDRP are so narrow and specific, we find no basis
for confirming and enforcing a UDRP panel
decision through § 9 [FAA]. Moreover, the FAA
only permits entry of judgment 'if the parties in
their agreement have agreed that a judgment of the
court shall be entered upon the award made
pursuant to the arbitration'. 9 USC § 9. The UDRP
nowhere suggests such agreement. It not only
countenances parallel litigation; it mandates a
judicial forum for challenges to UDRP decisions.
To initiate UDRP proceedings, a complainant must
first agree to litigate any challenges to the panel's
ruling in either the jurisdiction encompassing the
registrar's principal place of business or the
jurisdiction encompassing the registrant's record
address. See UDRP Rules 3(xiii). An aggrieved
registrant can effectively suspend the panel's
decision by filing a lawsuit in the specified
jurisdiction and notifying the registrar in accordance
with 4(k) of the UDRP.
Finally, we specifically hold that judicial review of
UDRP decisions is not confined to a motion to
vacate an arbitration award under §10 of the FAA.
To begin with, the FAA's structurel6 and basic
tenets of contract interpretation limit the extreme
deference of §10 and 12 to proceedings intended by
the contracting parties to be binding. The UDRP's
contemplation of parallel litigation and abbreviated
proceedings does not invite such deference.
... More importantly, the UDRP itself calls for
comprehensive, de novo adjudication of the
disputants' rights. Registrars will move forward with
a panel's decision only after a competent court or
arbitration panel determines that the original
registrant does "not have the right to continue to
use" the disputed domain name. This implies more
than a review of the procedural soundness of the
UDRP decision under §10 of the FAA; it implies
resolution of the parties' overarching trademark,
contract, and other claims and defenses. WIPO's
Final Report specifically recommended that the
3 See AMF Inc, 621 F Supp at 460.4Bankers Insurance Co, 2001 WL 293669, at *4.5 Section 3 of the FAA provides: " If any suit or proceeding be
brought in any of the courts of the United States upon any issue
referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such
arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending, upon being
satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is
referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on
application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until
such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of
the agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not in
default in proceeding with such arbitration."6 See Harrison v Nissan Motor Corp, 111 F 3d 343, 350 (3d Cir
1997).7 Wolsey, Ltd v Foodmaker, Inc, 144 F 3d 1205, 1208 (9th Cir
1998) (relying on Brunswick Corp and Harrison to conclude that
an agreement which did not permit recourse to the courts before
the decision of a third party constituted arbitration)
8 See BroadBridge Media, LLC v Hypercd.com, 106 F Supp 2d
505, 509 (SDNY 2000).
9 See Bankers Insurance Co, 2001 WL 293669, at *4.
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availability of the administrative procedure should
not preclude resort to court litigation by a party. In
particular, a party should be free to initiate litigation
by filing a claim in a competent national court
instead of initiating the administrative procedure, if
this is the preferred course of action, and should be
able to seek a de novo review of a dispute that has
been the subject of the administrative procedure."' °.
Conclusion and Analysis
On the basis of its analysis the court concluded that
the Federal Arbitration Act's limitations on judicial
review of arbitration awards did not apply to civil
actions seeking review of UDRP panel decisions
concerning domain names.
What then does the decision mean for the UK
registrant and its advisers? First, it means that, even if
a party has gone to the considerable expense of
defending a UDRP complaint, a disgruntled trademark
owner can still file suit in a competent court and
reargue the same issues, albeit under a different legal
head - trademark infringement. Given that there is
likely to be an imbalance of financial resources
between the plaintiff and the defendant in such cases,
the plaintiff may well succeed the second time around
by default.
Secondly, perhaps if the decision were by one of the
more "creative" panellists, it might be in the interest
of the defendant to have the entire case considered
again, but this time in a court where the registrant is
located. In this regard it should be noted that the
UDRP 4k states that actions must be brought either in
the court of the location of the Registrar's principal
office or of the Registrant's address as shown in the
Registrar's Whois database.
Thirdly, it may be advantageous to move Registrars
to one in a territory less unfavourable to Registrants
than the Eastern District of Virginia.
There have been a number of other recent domain
case developments and I shall return to these in future
months.
For further information please contact the author on tel:
+44 (0)141 332 9988; fax: +44 (0)141 332 8886; e-
mail: df@macroberts.co.uk.
'o WIPO Final Report, 150(iv). Cf Weber-Stephen Products Co v
Armitage Hardware and Building Supply, Inc, No 00-C-1738,
2000 WL 562470, at *2 (ND Ill. 3 May 2000) (district court
"not bound by the outcome of the ICANN administrative
proceeding").
CONSUMER PROTECTION
The OFT Is Watching You!
DLA
Introduction
Half of all UK websites could be in breach of the new
Distance Selling Regulations 2000 (the "Regulations")
(SI 2000/2334) according to a survey by the Office of
Fair Trading (OFT). It conducted a sweep of 637 UK
sites selling goods and services and found that more
than half failed to give easily accessible information
concerning refund or exchange policies. While most of
the sites examined did provide basic business contact
details and details of costs, many fell short in
providing information on both refund and exchange
policies, and how they would handle customers'
personal details.
The Distance Selling Regulations
The Regulations apply to any business which sells
goods or services to consumers using any form of
distance contracting, eg by mail order, telephone sales,
television shopping or the internet.
They set out the extent of the information which the
supplier must provide to the consumer both before an
order is placed and before delivery is made. The
Regulations also provide the consumer with a standard
"cooling-off" period of seven working days during
which the consumer has a right to cancel the contract,
return the goods and demand a full refund. However,
the cooling-off period may extend up to three months
and seven working days from the date the consumer
receives the goods if the supplier fails to provide the
consumer with the information specified in the
Regulations.
The supplier must provide certain information to
the consumer in good time and in a clear and
comprehensible form before he or she places an order.
This information includes the supplier's identity (and,
if the suppler requires payment in advance of delivery,
the supplier's address), a description of the main
characteristics of the goods or services, the price
(including all taxes), any delivery costs, the
arrangements for payment and delivery, and the
existence of the consumer's right to cancel the contract
during the cooling off period.
After the consumer has concluded his or her
contract with the supplier (and no later than delivery)
the supplier must provide to the consumer further
information including:
" the procedure for exercising the consumer's right to
cancel the contract and return the goods;
" the consumer's obligation to return the goods in the
event of cancellation;
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" whether the consumer or the supplier will be re-
sponsible for the cost of returning the goods or the
cost of recovering them;
" the geographical business address to which com-
plaints can be sent;
" details of any after-sale services or guarantees;
* the consumer's contractual rights to terminate on
ongoing contract (if appropriate).
The Length of the Cooling-off Period
If the written information is provided no later than the
date of delivery the right to cancel will expire seven
working days from the date of delivery. However, if
the supplier fails to provide the consumer with
information listed above until after delivery, the
consumer's cooling-off period will be extended to
seven working days from the date the consumer finally
received the information (subject to a maximum
cooling-off period of three months and seven working
days).
The cooling-off period, however, does not apply to
certain contracts including:
(1) contracts for the supply of goods made to the
customer's specifications or clearly personalised or
which by reason of their nature cannot be returned
or are liable to deteriorate or expire; and
(2) contracts for the supply of audio or video
recordings or computer software if they are unsealed
by the consumer.
The OFT has the power to apply to the courts to seek
an injunction against an individual supplier requiring
compliance with the Regulations.
Conclusion
The results of the OFT survey highlight that many
companies may require compliance advice to avoid
possible action by the OFT.
GAMING LAWS
And the Winner Is!
DLA
Background
for many web sites, no third party will be willing to
pay for banner adverts on web sites that cannot
demonstrate good hit rates.
One solution to this problem has been to take
advantage of the public's love of competitions by
offering some sort of online prize competition. Simple
and effective as this idea may be, it is very easy to end
up operating an illegal lottery or prize competition. It
is, therefore, important to realise the crucial legal
differences between lotteries, free prize draws and
competitions, some of which are quite subtle, as it is
very easy to end up breaking the law without even
realising it!
The basic difficulty stems from the question of
whether or not the winners are selected by pure
chance or by some element of skill. If it is a game of
pure chance, the likelihood is that the game will
constitute an illegal lottery or illegal prize competition.
Looking at each of the options in turn, anybody
thinking about offering some sort of prize competition
ought to be aware of the following issues.
Lotteries
A lottery involves the distribution of prizes to winners
who are chosen by random lot or by chance who will,
in turn, have made some sort of contribution to obtain
the opportunity to win.
In so doing, the winning of a prize does not depend
on the exercise of any skill. Also, the "contribution"
made by the entrant need not be money. Rather, the
"contribution" may include the cover price of a
magazine, a requirement on the entrant to submit his
entry via a premium line telephone number, or the
requirement to provide some proof of purchase of a
particular product which is associated with the
promotion.
If these elements are present, the competition will
be illegal by virtue of the Lotteries and Amusements
Act 1976 ("Act") unless the competition is exempted
as being one of the following: private lotteries
(members clubs etc); exempt entertainment (small
scale lotteries run at village fairs etc); societies'
lotteries (charitable/non profit making organisations);
local lotteries (those promoted by the local authority);
and the national lottery.
In addition, an ISP may be prosecuted under the
Act if it is "associated" with a lottery. Association is
widely drawn. It will not simply be the promoter of
the lottery (ie the web site owner) that is liable to be
prosecuted, but also the publisher, which could mean
an ISP hosting the relevant site.
Free Prize Draw
Over the last few months, many web site owners have
been focusing on new ways to attract traffic to their
web sites and then to ensure that those visitors keep
returning. Clearly, without traffic, no business will be
conducted through the web site. Also, and crucially
Free prize draws are legal as they do not meet the
criteria relating to lotteries. The fundamental
characteristic of a free prize draw is that no
contribution is required/made by the entrant (whether
direct, indirect or concealed, monetary or otherwise).
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Whilst a free prize draw over the internet is,
technically, not free because of the cost of the
underlying cost of the local call, the risks of the prize
draw being regarded as a lottery on this basis are very
low. Thus, if a person visits a web site and is offered
the chance of winning, for example, a holiday without
the need to "contribute" or "pay" for that chance in
any direct or indirect way, then this will be a free
prize draw and not a lottery.
Competitions
Some competitions are also legal. However, to be a
legal competition, the allocation of prizes must depend
to a substantial degree "on the exercise of skill". The
level of skill or dexterity, whether bodily or mental, of
the entrant need not be that high, though the
questions must not be so difficult that answering them
is a game of chance! Also, the level of skill must not
relate to the forecasting of a future event or any past
event where the result is not yet known. The reason
for skill in competitions is that it removes the element
of chance from determining the winner and this means
that the competition does not amount to a lottery. It is
also important to realise that the level of skill must be
present at all stages of the competition. Thus,
competitions where the names of all those who answer
the question correctly go into a pot where the winner
is chosen at random may be illegal if that element of
the competition turns it into a lottery. Thus, the
second round must not fall foul of the rules regarding
what is and what is not a free prize draw.
Conclusion
ISPs and web site owners must ensure that they do
not fall foul of the provisions relating to lotteries and
competitions. Lotteries must be avoided and the
simplest way of ensuring this is to require entrants to
answer questions as opposed to simply pulling their
names out of a hat. In addition, no charge (direct or
indirect) should be made so that the competition
constitutes a fee prize draw.
INTERNET AGREEMENTS
To Link or Not to Link
DLA
The Issue
One of the attractions of the Internet is the ease by
which users can move between different web sites by
clicking on the relevant hypertext links. Of late, many
of these links have taken the form of deep links or
frames. A deep link takes the user directly to the page
of interest on the linked site rather than to the home
page of that site whilst frames make the content from
the linked site appear as if it is on the original site.
Both of these practices have been increasingly
scrutinised by the courts both in Europe and across
the Atlantic. The risks of damaging advertising
revenue streams and possible brand confusion have
both been cited as reasons for prohibiting these types
of practice without the prior consent of the user of the
linked web site owner. Recent European case law
continues the line taken in the Shetland Times
interlocutory decision and highlights the necessity of
putting in place a suitable web site agreement. Recent
examples include the following:
In a German case the online recruitment company,
StepStone, has managed to obtain an injunction
against the Danish media group OFiR to prevent it
from deep linking to its web site and thereby
bypassing the banner advertisements on its homepage.
In the recent French decision of Havas & Cadres
Online v Keljob the French judge held that operators
implicitly authorised surface linking but that express
authorisation to deep link is needed under the French
Intellectual Property Code.
Also, in the UK, Haymarket has commenced legal
proceedings against Burmah Castrol for linking to two
of Haymarket's web sites, whatcar.com and
autosport.com. Burmah Castrol framed the
Haymarket's web pages with its own border,
suggesting that the Burmah Catrol web site is
associated with the Haymarket web sites.
It is becoming increasingly clear from these cases
that a cause of action will be found if the link results
in a change to the nature of the targeted content (ie
modifies the source code), misleads visitors as to the
ownership of the web page or does not alert visitors
that they are being redirected to an external web site.
The Essential Provisions of a Web Site
Agreement
From all of this, it is apparent that any company
wishing to link its web site to that of another company
must think very carefully about the way in which the
link is made, with deep links and frames being
particularly troublesome. As a result, companies must
now give some careful thought to formal linking
contracts. Failure to do so will, in many cases, result
in legal proceedings. Relevant issues to consider
include the following:
Specification of the Link
The link may be based on a trade mark and the form
and size of the link will be important in maintaining
the goodwill associated with the mark. If the link does
involve a trade mark, the trade mark holder will need
to grant a licence for its use to the other party.
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Location of the Mark
The location of the mark will also significantly affect
the amount of traffic flowing to the linked web site.
The agreement should specify whether, for example,
the link will be displayed on the homepage of the web
site or in the border framing the site.
Controlling Traffic
Will the flow of traffic be in one direction or will it be
bi-directional?
Warranties
The agreement, like any other agreement involving
intellectual property, should contain a mutual
warranty and indemnity. The agreement should also
contain additional warranties regarding the content of
the linked web site (eg no blasphemous or defamatory
material) and may include references to the code of
conduct of the Advertising Standards Agency or other
regulations peculiar to the industry sector concerned.
Competitors
The agreement may prevent each party from hosting a
link to any competitor of the other party. It may be
necessary to obtain competition law advice if such a
clause is to be used.
Royalties
In the short history of the Internet pay per click has
been the favoured method of calculating the revenue
owed the web site hosting the link but in recent
months an increasing number of agreements have
adopted payment on a bounty basis whereby the
hosting site will receive payment for each customer
which registers or purchases from the linked site. The
agreement should also identify the technology which
will be used to monitor and report on the visitors to
the linked web site.
Cutting the Link
The agreement should specify the grounds for
allowing the hosting web site to cut the link to the
linked web site. These grounds for termination may
well be tied into the warranties regarding the content
of the web site.
Affiliate Sites
Some sites, such as mytaxi.com, act as hubs for web
surfers, containing links to a variety of approved web
sites. Affiliate agreements should also incorporate a
monitoring mechanism to enable the host to ensure
that the linked sites do not contain immoral,
blasphemous or illegal content.
Good Practice
Finally, it is good practice for companies to include a
statement of its linking policy on the homepage of
their web sites. This policy should state that no
authority is given (impliedly or expressly) to deep link
to or to frame any of the content that appears on the
website or to use a representation of the company's
trade mark as a link button without the express
agreement of the company. Also, the company may
wish to reserve the right to prohibit links to its
homepage in certain circumstances.
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Competition
New Deadline for
Monopoly Report on
Banking Services
The Secretary of State and the
Chancellor have agreed a request
by the Competition Commission
for a four month extension to
complete their report on the
supply of banking services by
clearing banks to small and
medium sized businesses. This
will enable the Commission to
consider further arguments and
evidence from the banks.
The period for reporting on the
monopoly reference has been
extended from 19 June to 19 Octo-
ber 2001.
The Competition Commission
was asked by the Secretary of
State and the Chancellor of the
Exchequer on 20 March 2000
under section 51 of the Fair Trad-
ing Act 1973 to undertake a study
of the market for the supply of
banking services by clearing banks
to small and medium-sized busi-
nesses in the UK to identify any
monopoly situation and to form a
view as to whether any practices
which exploit or maintain a mono-
poly, or are attributable to such a
monopoly, operate against the
public interest.
Section 55(1) of the Fair Trad-
ing Act provides that a monopoly
reference shall specify a period
within which the Competition
Commission is to report.
Section 55(2) of the Fair Trad-
ing Act provides that Ministers
making the reference may give a
direction allowing the Competition
Commission an extended period
for reporting.
DTI Press Notice P120011312,
12.6.01
Employment
CIPD Guide on Employing
People with Convictions
The way in which organisations
obtain information about criminal
records is about to change. The
Criminal Records Bureau (CRB)
has been set up to improve access
to such information through a new
service called 'Disclosure'. In light
of these changes, the Chartered
Institute Personnel and Develop-
ment (CIPD) has launched A good
practice guide on the employment of
people with criminal records, pro-
duced for the CRB.
The guide's primary aim is to
help organisations adapt to new
legislation, namely the Police Act
1997, which has introduced the
new arrangements for obtaining
criminal record information. The
CRB provides a single access point
- a one-stop-shop service -
improving the current arrange-
ments where employers had to
approach up to three separate
organisations.
The CIPD guidance has been
endorsed by organisations such as
Apex Trust, Nacro, the TUC and
ACAS. The publication offers
advice and guidance on how to
implement fair and effective poli-
cies for recruiting and retaining
those with criminal records.
Dianah Worman, CIPD Advi-
ser, Equal Opportunities said:
"While research shows that
employment is the single most
important factor in reducing
reoffending, many ex-offenders
remain excluded from the
employment market due to poor
qualifications and a lack of work
experience. Our guidance
encourages employers to be
open minded and make objective
assessments based on merit and
ability to do the job".
Whilst providing background
information about ex-offenders in
the workplace and current legisla-
tion, the guide offers good practice
recommendations such as when to
obtain a 'Disclosure' and how best
to handle such sensitive informa-
tion.
Bernard Herdan, CRB Chief
Executive says:
"The aim of the CRB is to
promote safer recruitment to
protect the vulnerable.
Providing employers and
voluntary bodies with greater
access to criminal record
information through 'Disclosure'
will help prevent unsuitable
people gaining access to jobs
where they could harm children
or vulnerable adults. Disclosure,
however, should be seen as part
of an overall package of good
recruitment techniques to help
reach a judgement on a
candidate's suitability.
I believe that this sort of
partnership between the CRB
and the CIPD - bringing
together the required skills and
experiences for a specific piece
of work - is the way forward.
The CIPD has produced
valuable and informative
guidance material for which I
am most grateful."
The CIPD website address is
http://www.cipd.co.uk.
Copies of Employing people with
conviction can be obtained free of
charge by calling Rachel Hansen
on 020 8263 3283.
CIPD Press Release, 29.5.01
Extra Help for Working
Parents
Parents of disabled children will
soon benefit from new measures
announced by the Trade and
Industry Secretary recently. Their
parental leave entitlement is to be
increased from 13 to 18 weeks.
This will give parents of children
with disabilities greater flexibility
to strike the balance between
working and caring for their
child's additional needs. The move
is supported by business, parent
and disability groups.
Mr Byers also announced that
all parents with children under
five will soon be able to take par-
ental leave. Previously, this was
available only to parents whose
children were born after 15
December 1999. This extension
will benefit around 2.8 million
parents.
Parental leave is the right for
parents to take 13 weeks' unpaid
leave from work. This can be
taken up until the child's 5th
birthday, or for the parents of dis-
abled children, until their child's
18th birthday.
The proposal to increase the
amount of parental leave for those
with disabled children was first
put forward in the Work and Par-
Copyright' 2007 by Kluwer Law International. All rights reserved.
No claim asserted to original government works.
Business Law Review July 2000 183
Infobank
ents: Competitiveness and Choice
Green Paper published on 7
December 2000. Increasing the
level of unpaid parental leave
available to parents of disabled
children was strongly supported
by parents and by employers, in
the responses received in the con-
sultation process.
This leave is available to parents
of children who receive Disability
Living Allowance. This is paid for
a child with a physical or mental
illness or disability if they need
more help or care than other chil-
dren of the same age because of
their illnessor disability.
Parents of disabled children will
be entitled to 18 weeks parental
leave from work which can be
taken up until the child's 18th
birthday. This leave can be taken
flexibly in blocks of a day or more,
up to 4 weeks in total each year.
The timing of the leave has to be
agreed with the employer and
notice has to be given.
Parents of disabled children are
currently entitled to 13 weeks'
parental leave which can be taken
up to the child's 18th birthday.
The extension of parental leave
to parents with children under five
years old will be backdated to 15
December 1999. Currently, only
parents whose children were born
or adopted on or after 15 Decem-
ber 1999 are entitled to take par-
ental leave.
These changes will come into
force later this year.
All parents are able to take
time-off to deal with a family
emergency, such as their child fall-
ing ill or unexpected disruption in
their care arrangements, without
notice.
DTI Press Notice P/2001/260,
25.4.01
European Union
New Consultation
Directive - UK Works
Councils Are Not
Inevitable
The Chartered Institute of Per-
sonnel and Development (CIPD)
states that works councils are not
an inevitable outcome of the EU
directive on information and con-
sultation - something which most
commentators believe to be the
case. In fact the Directive will not
necessarily require UK organisa-
tions to establish any form of
representative structures for
informing and consulting staff.
On 11 June, the EU Employ-
ment and Social Council agreed on
a Directive requiring organisations
to inform and consult their
employees on a range of work and
business matters. The majority of
observers have argued that this
will require UK companies to set
up works councils, similar to those
in most other Member States,
including France and Germany.
This has caused great concern
across UK industry, with fears
that it will undermine the ability
of managers to manage.
Diane Sinclair, CIPD Adviser,
Employee Relations says:
"The directive clearly leaves the
practical arrangements for
informing and consulting
employees to be defined by the
Member States. Thus, much
will depend upon the way that
the Directive is implemented in
the UK.
Given its persistent opposition
to the proposal, and its
abstention from the final vote, it
seems very unlikely that the UK
government will 'goldplate' the
Directive. Indeed, it has already
stated that it will take full
advantage of the flexibility
allowed by the text, which it
worked hard to negotiate."
Where management and
employees agree, rather than
representative structures, organisa-
tions may be able to meet the
requirements of the new law by
communicating directly with
employees. For instance, e-mails
or letters could be sent to employ-
ees informing them of business
issues or changes to work organi-
sation, and inviting them to com-
ment. Staff briefings could also be
used to inform and consult
employees.
Ms Sinclair says that research
shows that direct involvement and
communication with employees is
more important for business per-
formance than representative
structures. Good employers know
the value of effective communica-
tion and consultation with staff.
"For the government's part, it
must take a practical approach
to implementing the Directive,
which is based on the European
social model in which works
councils play a starring role.
There is no reason why the UK
should be led down this path.
Rather, it must learn from the
best in Europe, and maintain
the most effective features of its
flexible systems and practices.
Notes
The information and consultation
Directive gives employees the
right to be informed about the
"recent and probable" develop-
ment of their organisation's activ-
ities and economic situation. They
will also have the right to be
informed and consulted on:
" the development of employment
within their organisation, parti-
cularly where there is a threat to
jobs; and
" any decisions likely to result in
substantial changes in work or-
ganisation or in their employ-
ment contracts.
The directive is due to be
implemented in the UK three
years after it is formally adopted,
which is expected by the end of
this year. The current text pro-
vides that organisations with over
150 employees will be covered
from that time, while those
employing between 100 and 150
people will have a further two
years, and those with over 50 but
fewer than 100 employees will
have a full seven years for imple-
mentation.
CIPD Press Notice, 18.6.01
Taxation
Finance Bill: Limited
Liability Partnerships
The Chief Secretary to the Treas-
ury, Andrew Smith MP,has tabled
new clauses for the Finance Bill
(New Clauses 16 and 17) to ensure
that limited liability partnerships
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(LLPs) are in general treated as
partnerships for tax purposes and
to prevent tax loss through LLPs
used for investment and property
investment.
Details
New Clause 16 ensures that LLPs
incorporated under the Limited
Liability Partnership Act 2000 are
in general treated as partnerships
for tax purposes. It amends sec-
tion 118ZA ICTA 1988 and sec-
tion 59A TCGA 1992 that were
introduced by the Limited Liabi-
lity Partnership Act 2000. It also
introduces a new section (169A) to
the Taxation of Chargeable Gains
Act to prevent chargeable gains
held over on business gifts from
falling out of charge when an LLP
goes into liquidation.
New Clause 17 and New Sche-
dule 2 prevent tax loss through
LLPs used for investment and
property investment. Definitions
of investment and property invest-
ment LLPs are introduced. Inter-
est relief for investments by
individuals in investment LLPs is
removed by amending section
362(2)(a) ICTA 1988. This aligns
the treatment of investment LLPs
with limited partnerships regis-
tered under the Limited Partner-
ship Act 1907. Exemptions for
income and gains will not apply
for pension funds, the pension
business of life insurance compa-
nies and the tax exempt business
of friendly societies where the
income and gains are received in
their capacity as a member of a
property investment LLP.
The government's intention to
bring forward rules to prevent tax
loss was set out in the Pre-Budget
Report Press Release Inland Rev-
enue 5 "A More Competitive
Environment for Business" pub-
lished on 8 November 2000.
The intention to clarify the tax
rules at section 118ZA ICTA 1988
and section 59A TCGA 1992, and
further details about the rules to
prevent tax loss were set out in the
Budget Press Release BN 14
"Limited Liability Partnerships"
published on 7 March 2001.
Information about the Limited
Liability Partnership Act 2000 and
the Regulations made under that
act is available from Department
of Trade and Industry at http://
www.dti.gov.uk/cld/llpbill/
index.htm.
The Explanatory Notes accompa-
nying these New Clauses may be
found at http://www.inlandreve-
nue.gov.uk/menus/legalmenu.htm.
Inland Revenue Press Release
78/01, 3.5.01
Finance Bill New Clause
Interest on Unpaid Tax, etc:
FMD
The Chief Secretary to the Treas-
ury, Andrew Smith MP, has
tabled a new clause to the Finance
Bill which confirms that businesses
will not have to pay interest on tax
deferred as a result of financial dif-
ficulty brought about by the out-
break of foot and mouth disease.
Businesses who are suffering
severe disruption or financial dis-
tress as a result of the outbreak
need to be able to put tax and
NICs issues to one side during the
outbreak, so those with concerns
are urged to contact the joint
Inland Revenue/Customs and
Excise Foot and Mouth Helpline
on 0845 300 0157.
Details
The new clause will provide speci-
fically for the charge to interest to
be removed where the Inland Rev-
enue have agreed, because of the
effect of the foot-and-mouth dis-
ease outbreak, to defer payment of
tax.
Current legislation requires
interest to be charged on all
unpaid tax from the date it
becomes due until the date of pay-
ment. The Inland Revenue can
defer payment of tax, and both tax
and interest can also ultimately be
written off or remitted in certain
circumstances. This new clause
will ensure that the Revenue can
waive interest charges inall the cir-
cumstances of the foot-and-mouth
disease outbreak.
Regulations will also be intro-
duced to provide that interest is
not charged on National Insurance
contributions deferred in the same
circumstances.
A joint Inland Revenue/Cus-
toms & Excise press release was
issued on 14 April confirming that
businesses will not have to pay
interest on tax or National Insur-
ance Contributions deferred as a
result of serious financial difficulty
brought about by Foot and Mouth
disease.
The draft regulations on interest
on deferred National Insurance
contributions are available on the
Inland Revenue web site at http://
www.inlandrevenue.gov.uk.
Inland Revenue Press Release
79/01, 4.5.01
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